determine who should win.) 16 Weighing and balancing have always been key concepts in all endeavours to solve legal disputes, not only in state-individual relations, but also in private relations. 17 South African private law literature abounds with innumerable references to the weighing and balancing of interests. Duncan Kennedy 18 succinctly defines the relationship between private law balancing and public law proportionality as follows:
[M]y hypothesis is that there is a single evolving template, organized around conflict between rights and powers, between powers, between rights, involving in each case the same three questions: (a) Have the parties acted within, or been injured with respect to, their legally recognised powers or rights? (b) Has the injuror acted in a way that avoids unnecessary injury to the victim's legally protected interest? (c) If so, is the injury acceptable given the relative importance of the rights and powers asserted by the injuror and the victim? While there are, of course, dramatic practical institutional differences between balancing in private and public law, it is not clear to me that there are any differences at this more abstract analytical level.
A "due" relation between the limitation and its purpose would render the limitation justifiable. The dictionary meanings of proportionality do not tell us what kind of relation is due or appropriate. However, the mere use of the term relation implies that some or other kind of link between a limitation and a purpose must exist. This rules out the possibility that a limitation can be justified if no purpose exists, or if no purpose that may be legitimately pursued exists, or if the limitation is completely incapable of promoting the purpose. In this sense, the ordinary meaning of proportionality contains the essence of Cohen-Eliya's and Porat's preferred explanation for the spread and the global popularity of proportionality, namely that it is a key component of a culture of accountability in which those who harm others 16 The fact that the outcome of contests often leaves "losers" dissatisfied forms one of the bases of appeal systems and a right to appeal in criminal and civil proceedings. Kennedy "Transitional Genealogy" 190 has a different take on this: "In balancing, we understand ourselves to be choosing a norm (not choosing a winning party) among a number of permissible alternatives on the ground that it best balances or combines conflicting normative considerations." He then constructs the relevancy of the position of the parties involved by explaining that the normative considerations "vary in strength across an imagined spectrum of fact situations". How choosing the best balancing norm to deal with the space occupied by the contestants and their rights and interests in the imagined spectrum without eventually "choosing a winning party" is not clear.
must at the very least provide plausible reasons for doing so. 19 Andenas and Zlepting state: "Proportionality thus becomes a tool to enhance accountability and justification for governmental action. Additionally, judges may also become more accountable since they also have to justify their decisions in a detailed fashion." 20 It must be noted, however, that proportionality involves more than just providing reasons for the sake of accountability regardless of whether they are good or silly reasons. In very general terms it is usually also stated that the reasons given must be "plausible" or "proper" reasons, and whatever "plausible" or "proper" might mean, these qualifications mean that proportionality inevitably also has a substantive meaning.
There seems to be a fair amount of consensus on the elements of proportionality.
These elements are also known as "stages", 21 or rules "in the sense of optimization requirements", or "subprinciples of the proportionality test", 22 or "the four-prong structure of proportionality". 23 Whatever they are called, the following are usually referred to: legitimate ends (purposes), suitability, necessity, and proportionality in a narrow sense. 24 Klatt and Meister summarise the meaning of the different concepts as follows:
The first stage examines whether the act pursues a legitimate aim; suitability, whether the act is capable of achieving this aim; necessity, whether the act impairs 19 Cohen-Eliya and Porat Proportionality 111-113. Other explanations for the spread of proportionality include, according the authors (104) (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) (110) (111) , that it is useful for young democracies, that it is useful for the resolution of conflicts in divided societies, and that it provides a crossborder lingua franca for legal communities. They find these explanations wanting because the principle is as useful in so-called old democracies and in more or less homogeneous societies, and regressive concepts based on eg authoritarianism and racial superiority could as such also form part of an international lingua franca in certain societies and states. Cohen-Eliya and Porat Proportionality [111] [112] refer to Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 10 as one of the sources of the term "culture of justification". the right as little as possible; and the balancing stage, whether the act represents a net gain, when the reduction on enjoyment of rights is weighed against the level of realization of the aim. 25 However, one must be careful not to oversimplify the "rules" contained in this summary. For example, "whether the act is capable of achieving this aim" is generally known as a rational relationship test with which all factual limitations must comply. But it must be noted that in its most basic form it simply means that the limitation is capable of contributing "something" towards achieving the goal, which can never be said to be the final answer in respect of suitability. In certain instances depending on the weighing exercise in the final stage it may be required that the limitation must be capable of contributing "substantively" or "in all respects" towards the goal.
In this article, "the limitation of rights" refers to situations in which laws or actions, after the commencement of the Constitution, affect the conduct and interests protected by the constitutional rights. Constitutionally valid limitations must comply with all of the requirements imposed by the Constitution. How these limitations may be formulated in a Constitution is referred to below.
The qualification "after the commencement of the Constitution" indicates that we are not concerned in this article with certain limitations inserted in the definition of the rights by the constitution makers by, for example, limiting those who may benefit from the right expressly to children or citizens; or by excluding expressly certain conduct and interests from the ordinary meaning of the words used in the text to describe the protected conduct and interest. 26 Constitution makers follow the latter approach when they are convinced that the excluded conduct is so harmful to other 25 Klatt and Meister Constitutional Structure 8. Also see Cohen-Eliya and Porat Proportionality 17:
nce the government has demonstrated that it is pursuing a legitimate end, it must meet the following three subtests: first, the means adopted to realize the government's goal must be suited to furthering that end (sustainability). Second, the means chosen must be those that least infringe on the individual's right (necessity). Third, the harm to the individual resulting from the infringement on his or her right must be proportional to the government's gain from furthering its goal (proportionality in the strict sense)." Also see Andenas and Zlepting 2007 In respect of such provisions see Rautenbach Constitutional Law 314-317. 36 The rights referred to in (aa) are the rights to human dignity, freedom and security of the person, not to be subjected to servitude or forced labour, freedom of religion, belief and opinion, to vote and to participate in political activities; the rights of detained, arrested and accused persons, and certain rights of children.
shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in paragraph (a)(i), also be necessary.
This general limitation clause did not refer expressly to proportionality. The Canadian courts have evolved certain criteria, in applying [section 1], such as the existence of substantial and pressing public needs which are met by the impugned statute. There, if the statutory violation is to be justified it must also pass a 'proportionality' test, which the courts dissect into several components. … These criteria may well be of assistance to our courts in cases where a delicate balancing of individual rights against social interests is required. But section 33(1) itself sets out the criteria which we are to apply, and I see no reason, in this case at least, to attempt to fit our analysis into the Canadian pattern.
However, having said that, the Court then did indeed consider the generally recognized elements of the proportionality review, namely "a rational connection test" as part of balanced relation between the limitation and its purpose, the nature of the rights affected as being "fundamental to our concepts of justice and forensic fairness", the availability of less intrusive ways to achieve the purpose (the state failed to convince the Court "that it is in practice impossible or unduly burdensome for the State to discharge its onus"), "administration of justice" as a purpose of the
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The rights referred to in (bb) are the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, petition, association, movement, access to information and administrative justice. Although the approach of these Courts to proportionality is not identical, all recognise that proportionality is an essential requirement of any legitimate limitation of an entrenched right. Proportionality is also inherent in the different levels of scrutiny applied by United States courts to governmental action.] This is implicit in the provisions of section 33(1). The fact that different rights have different implications for democracy, and in the case of our Constitution, for 'an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality', means that there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to particular circumstances can only be done on a case by case basis. This is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which calls for the balancing of different interests. In the balancing process, the relevant considerations will include the nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question. In the process regard must be had to the provisions of section 33(1), and the underlying values of the Constitution, bearing in mind that, as a Canadian Judge has said, 'the role of the Court is not to second-guess the wisdom of policy choices made by legislators'. 
Proportionality and the general limitation clause in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996
The statement of Chaskalson P quoted at the end of paragraph 3 contains features that provide context to the way in which the general limitation clause in the final Constitution was formulated: first, the judge clearly linked proportionality and balancing/weighing; second, the judge emphasised that reasonableness and necessity are general standards to be given effect to in concrete situations; and third, the Court said that the recognised elements of proportionality are considerations to be taken into account in the balancing process.
In order to relate how these features assisted with the formulation of section 36 of the final Constitution, one has to refer to the reasons why certain aspects of section categories to which different standards of review must be applied. The reasons for doing so pertain both to the formal ranking of rights in order to apply different standards of review to the different categories, and to the meaning and significance that should be attached to the words and phrases that are usually used to describe the general standard of review.
As far as the formal ranking of rights is concerned, it was explained elsewhere that the so-called bifurcated approach was probably abandoned for various reasons.
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First, it is a drastic and rigid measure to constitutionally entrench a fixed list of ranked rights. If in future the "relative importance" of rights should change, the ranking can be altered only by constitutional amendment, whereas such changes can effectively be dealt with by applying a general limitation clause that requires that the nature of the affected right must be investigated. Second, it is extremely difficult to reach agreement on such ranking. 55 And third, developing stricter standards to apply to limitation does not depend only on the relative importance of the rights concerned but also, for example, on which aspects of a right are affected and the nature and extent of a limitation. For example, a stricter standard is applied to the invasion of 53 On the American levels of scrutiny see Weaver Constitutional Law 760. In respect of the application of different standards to different kinds of limitation to the right to equality in German law see Grünberger "Prinzip" 97. 54 See Rautenbach "Introduction" para 1A-49 fn 11.
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Du Plessis and Corder Understanding 126 observes that "the process of identifying rights for this purpose is inevitably arbitrary …".
so-called personal inner-sanctum privacy than to the invasion of privacy in respect of business transactions, and to the limitation of the right to personal freedom by incarceration than to the limitation of the same right by a request to stand in a queue to vote or to apply for the renewal of a driver's licence.
Extended debates were conducted during the negotiations on the basis of the feature of the formulation in the interim Constitution that the phrase "reasonable and necessary" describes a stricter test than the word "reasonable". It was assumed that the strictness or otherwise of limitation requirements could for all future purposes be determined by using specific words and phrases. The negotiators apparently changed course when they realised that regardless of which terms are used to define the general standard in various foreign Bills of Rights and other human rights instruments, the effective and meaningful application of all the concepts involved some or other form of proportionality. At the time the Constitutional Assembly realised something which was described much later in the following terms by Andenas and Zlepting: 57 It can also be the case that similar tests are given different names, such as necessity, reasonableness, cost-benefit-analysis, or rationality review, and yet their normative requirements may be very similar to the proportionality test. and freedom", 59 that the word "proportionality" would not feature in the description, and that a duty must be imposed on everybody who interprets or applies the general limitation clause to take into account the matters referred to in the Makwanyane case, namely the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose, the nature and extent of the limitation and the relation between the limitation and its purposes, and to these "less restrictive means to achieve the purpose" were added. Section 36(1) of the Constitution thus reads:
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including -(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
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In a somewhat different context Schlink "Proportionality" 302 observed: "The case-specific configuration of facts, interests, and rights becomes more important and more significant than the doctrine that surrounds the case."
59
There was some debate on whether "equality" should precede "freedom", or the other way round. The egalitarians carried the day. Nobody objected to the insertion of "human dignity" before the two other concepts.
Academic objections against the Chaskalson dicta in the Makwanyane case and the formulation of section 36
Academics who before the adoption of the interim Constitution advocated the Canadian approach towards the limitation of rights in great detail were "taken by surprise" and disappointed. They were critical of both the Chaskalson dicta in the Makwanyane case and the formulation in the final Constitution.
60 They still are.
Despite the global appeal of proportionality as described in paragraph 1 above, these writers are opposed to the concept. describe the order in which the factors must be considered, and that the only instruction section 33 of the interim Constitution contained in this regard was that the right that has been factually limited must first be classified as a right to which only a reasonableness standard applies or a right to which both a reasonable-andnecessary standard applies. Section 33 of the interim Constitution contained no instruction that American, Canadian, German or Indian steps to apply a Bill of Rights had to be followed. Likewise, section 36 of the final Constitution leaves it to those who apply and review limitations to decide in which order they wish to consider the elements of proportionality or how much weight they must attach to the relevant factors when they do the weighing or balancing. It also does not contain any instruction in respect of which questions concerning elements must be considered on a preliminary basis, that is before a proportionality or balancing exercise is being undertaken. Nothing in the text of section 36 precludes making such distinctions. In this regard it must be noted that although such instructions do not appear anywhere in the German Bill of Rights, a distinction has always been made in Germany between the proportionality elements of legitimacy, suitability and necessity on the one hand, and so-called proportionality in the narrow or strict sense, which involves Nowhere has a test of this nature been formulated that is capable of providing a single fit-all standard of review for all factual limitations. As will be explained below, In terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution, the general requirements for the limitation of any right is that it may be limited only in terms of law of general application "to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom". The reference to "law of general application" gives effect to the formal aspects of the rule of law or legality, namely that all limitation must be authorised by legal rules.
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In investigating the second part of the general test that refers to the reasonableness and justifiability of a limitation of the right, the factors in section 36(1)(a) to (e) must be taken into account. How is the taking into account of the factors in section 36(1)(a) to (e) supposed to assist us in applying the general standard of "reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom?" First, to state the obvious, by including the elements of proportionality in the general limitation clause the Constitutional Assembly clearly indicated that it wished proportionality in some or other form to play a role in applying the general standard.
The similarities between the generally recognised element of proportionality as described in paragraph 2 above are simply too obvious for anyone to be able to miss this point.
Second, the fact that the matters to be taken into account refer to information about the concrete circumstances of specific limitations that conform to the general standard of "reasonableness and justifiability" does not mean that the requirements for the justification of the limitation are pitched at exactly the same level of strictness for all cases. In a certain sense, the requirements for a particular case are determined by the interplay in a weighing process of the information on matters like those referred to in section 36(1)(a) to (e The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater the importance of satisfying the other.
The principles referred to in this formulation can for our purposes be described as, on the one hand, the right that has been limited and, on the other hand, the interests or rights protected or promoted in terms of the purpose of the limitation. It is clear from this law that depending on the degree of interference with a right by the limitation, the requirements to establish that a limitation is "reasonable and justifiable" would differ. The justification of greater degrees of interference clearly requires more important or more compelling purposes and more certainty (for example, on a scale of possibly, probably or necessary) in respect of the extent to which the limitation will serve the purpose than lesser degrees of interference. As stated by the South African Constitutional Court: "The more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds of justification must be."
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It is also clear from the formulation in section 36(1)(a) to (e) that requirements for justification are not prescribed in these paragraphs. They prescribe that certain information must be obtained and considered in order to apply the general standard to a specific case. Proportionality analysis does not replace the general standard that all limitations must be "reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic state based on human dignity, equality and freedom". The latter is not an empty, meaningless phrase. In the final analysis, the information on the matters referred to in section 36(1)(a) to (e) is not needed to perform weighing and balancing for the sake of weighing and balancing as a useful forensic tool. Section 36 requires that the weighing must have a specified substantive outcome, namely an outcome that is dignity, equality and freedom. Is there anyone who can honestly say that she or he does not know the difference between these two kinds of society?
The matters that must be taken into account according to section 36(1)(a) to (e) are analysed in South African handbooks. 80 The purpose of the following subparagraph (paragraph 6.2) is to add a few insights gained from the description and discussion by Klatt and Meister of Alexy's weight formula. Only a brief outline of the formula is presented here and it must be emphasised that only a few inferences are drawn.
Much more needs to be done in this field.
The Alexy weight formula and section 36(1) of the South African

Constitution
Klatt and Meister 81 describe the weight formula as follows:
The greater the product of reliability, intensity of interference and abstract weight of one principle is, the greater must be the product of reliability, intensity of interference and abstract weight of the other principle.
For South African purposes the formula could be adapted to read:
The greater the combined effect of the abstract weight of the right that has been limited, the intensity of the interference with the right and the reliability of empirical information concerning the abstract weight and the intensity is, the greater must be the combined effect of the abstract weight of interests and rights served by the limitation, the intensity on those interests and rights if the measure to limit the right has not been undertaken and reliability of the empirical information concerning the abstract weight and the intensity.
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The mathematical expression of the basic weight formula looks like this: 
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"Concrete weight" or "intensity of interference" or "extent of reliability of empirical premises" has inevitably to be located at a certain level somewhere on a scale of respectively "concrete weights", "intensity of interferences" or "reliability of premises". 84 A decision has also to be made on how many levels to use, for example, three, namely  in the case of concrete weight: less important, important and very important;
 in the case of intensity: light, moderate or serious;
 in the case or empirical reliability: certainty, average certainty, or uncertainty (or necessity, probability, or possibility).
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In order to do a calculation, decisions will also have to be taken on the numerical value of these levels, such as 1, 2 and 3. And there is no law that says that these values must be the same for every category of variable above and below the line.
Decisions of this nature could, of course, be controversial. Decisions on the number and nature of the levels and the numerical value assigned to the levels are not empirically objective. This fact serves as a sober reminder that the weight formula "is by no means an attempt to replace balancing with a mere calculation".
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However, this does not mean that assigning weight to the variables in the formula is the Achilles heel of the proportionality project. It should rather be seen as the entry point of the socio-economic and political impulses that inevitably form the bases of 83 For examples see Alexy "Konstruktion" and Alexy "Ideales Sollen". It is unlikely that South African Courts, practitioners and scholars will follow suit. The levels of abstraction reached in the debates on the Alexy model can be daunting. 87 It is not difficult to predict that South African Courts and practitioners will not be inclined to use the mathematical format of the formula. However, the weight fomula presents a structure in which all the particles of proportionality analysis are comprehensively linked. Valuable lessons can be learned from it when verbalised proportionality templates and structures are developed in particular systems.
For example, one aspect that is clearly "visible" in the mathematical formula is that a limitation is unconstitutional when the combined effect of the factors in respect of the right and the effect of limitation is greater than the combined effect of the factors relating to the purpose of the limitation. 88 The mere fact that the abstract weight of the limited right, for instance, is greater than the abstract weight of the public interest or private right that is being protected is not decisive; the higher abstract weight of the right may be neutralised or exceeded by the other variables of the formula. 89 It also means that when the weights attached to the importance of the right and the importance of the purpose are considered to be equal, the outcome will be determined by the other variables.
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Against this background the following can be said about the role of information in the determination of the matters referred to in section 36(1)(a) to (e) of the Constitution. In doing so, it must be noted that because section 36(1) provides that all of the relevant factors must be taken into account, matters covered in the German weight formula and not in the South African application can always be added to a South African template; and, as will be pointed out below, in taking 87 See, for example, Alexy "Konstruktion" and Alexy "Ideales Sollen". and freedom". It is always concluded that the right is very important, which is not surprising, because that, after all, is why it was entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
The abstract importance of the affected right relative to other rights must be distinguished from that importance relative to the importance of the purpose of the limitation, which may include the exercise, protection or promotion of another individual right (for example, in the context of the law of delict or the law of contract). The latter is an aspect of the weighing of colliding rights. In this regard,
Klatt and Meister comments as follows:
The abstract weights of colliding human rights are often equal, and then, can be disregarded in balancing. Sometimes, however, the abstract weights of the colliding principles are not equal. The right to life, for example, has a higher abstract weight than the right to property.
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In South Africa the nature of the right also refers to a particular aspect of the right that has been limited, and in this regard different weights can indeed be accorded to different aspects of the right to property, 92 for example, and the right to freedom of expression. 93 The nature of the right also refers to the nature of the bearer of the right in that particular case. Whether the bearer is a natural or juristic person could, 91 Klatt and Meister Constitutional Structure 11, 27-28. for example, in the case of the right to privacy, influence the strictness of the standard.
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The importance of the purpose of the limitation (section 36(1)(b)) constitutes the abstract weight of the interests and rights that the limitation protects or promotes. A legitimate purpose must be protected or promoted and the actions to execute the limitation must thus fall within the powers of the person or institution that limits the right. 95 The legality of the limiting law or action is, of course, also covered by the requirement in the introductory part of section 36 (1), that a limitation must be "in terms of law of general application", and it is therefore sometimes considered not to form part of the "proportionality in the narrow sense" which forms the focus of the German formula. However, as far as this proportionality in the narrow sense is concerned, it is important to note that the importance of the purpose of the limitation involves more than mere formal legality or formal infra vires. The purpose of the limitation refers also to the benefit that can be achieved by limiting the right and the importance of achieving that benefit in an "open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom". In this sense, the mere exercise of a legitimate power or a legal competence is not the purpose that must be noted for balancing purposes; 96 the importance of the purposes for which such powers and competences are exercised must be determined. nature of a limitation also relates to the methods and instruments used to limit the right. A discretion to limit rights in an authorising law forms part of the methods to limit rights. The extent of a limitation may therefore be influenced by the width or narrowness of the discretion. At the same time, whether a narrow or wide discretion to limit rights is constitutionally permitted in a particular case could depend on how seriously a right may be affected by the limitations that may be imposed. The extent of a discretion to limit rights therefore forms part of the nature and extent of a limitation. 97 In the German weight model, the counterweight to the intensity of the Information on less restrictive ways to achieve the purpose (section 36(1)(e)) relates to the proportionality element that when there are two or more suitable ways of furthering the purpose of a limitation effectively, the one that interferes less intensively with the right that is to be limited, must be chosen. 101 Alternative ways of limiting as effectively the right for the same purpose must be taken into account.
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The range of permissible options that the person or institution who limits rights may choose from also determines the strictness or otherwise of the test that is applied in a particular case. the purpose of the limitation, it is unthinkable that a discretion to limit could on any basis whatsoever mean that the permissible range of options to choose from includes ways of limiting rights that are otherwise unconstitutional. As has been stated elsewhere, the number of constitutionally permissible alternatives in the range of alternatives determines the extent of the discretion to limit rights, the "margin of appreciation", the limits of a strict separation of powers, and the judicial deference towards and respect for the expertise and responsibilities of those who limit rights.
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Schlink describes the problems concerning the reliability of information in the proportionality analysis ( and in the Alexy formula) as follows:
The fitness and the necessity of a means is an empirical problem, and often science, scholarship, and experience can help in solving it. But often all one has are assumptions, contradictory experiences, and as many expert opinions as there are interests involved. Climate change is an example. Beyond basic agreement that climate change is dangerous and has to be countered, information about the extent of the dangers and the effectiveness of the countermeasures is ambiguous and insufficient.
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Schlink submits that the problem can be solved by the rules of onus of proof. 105 In South Africa applicants who allege that their right has been violated or threatened bear the onus to adduce evidence to that effect, whereas those who rely on compliance with the requirements for the factual limitation of the right bear the onus of proving the necessary facts. 106 However, the mere location of the onus does not 103 Rautenbach Constitutional Law 314.
Schlink "Proportionality" 299. discrimination: when a complainant has proved differentiation on a ground listed in s 9(3), the discriminator must prove that the differentiation was not unfair in the sense that it did not disparage human dignity or did not have a similarly serious consequence. Acccording to Schlink, onus rules are decided upon by taking into account the relevant importance of the rights affected and the purpose of the limitation, apparently in a kind of preliminary proportionality investigation. This is not the case with the exception in s 9(3). The exception deals with the effect of a differentiation on the interests protected by the right to equality and thus with the first part of a Bill of Rights enquiry, in this case, whether or not there has been unfair discrimination (unfair discrimination is according to the Constitutional Court differentiation that affects human dignity or has similar serious consequences -Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) tell us which level of reliability of the information concerning certain variables in the Alexy formula is required to dispose of the onus. Alexy's second law of balancing (as reformulated by Klatt and Meister, 107 Courts often fail to recognise these provisions as dealing with the limitation of the rights concerned and consequently deal with them as if they form part of the description of the conduct and interests protected by the right or the duties imposed by the right, the judgments of the Courts clearly reveal that they apply elements of para 50). The ratio of the exception in s 9(3) is that discrimination on a ground listed in s 9(3) has since time immemorial been known to violate human dignity. It is therefore not unrealistic to assume that such discrimination is unfair. The exception deals with the quality of evidence and not with the importance of the rights and purposes involved.
proportionality when they are applying the particular words and phrases. 108 Dealing with the limitation of these rights in this way sometimes unfortunately results in a rather haphazard review of the limitation of the rights concerned.
The following are a few examples. The Constitutional Court held that section 9(1) of the Constitution requires that differentiation that does not amount to unfair discrimination must be rationally related to the purpose of the differentiation and that an enquiry in this regard belongs to the first stage of a Bill of Rights investigation. 109 However, the existence of a rational relationship between the differentiation and its purpose is a matter covered by section 36(1)(d). It is the weakest test that can be applied to the limitation of a right, 110 and the general limitation clause need not be applied after a Court has found that no rational relationship exists in a particular case. 111 The Constitutional Court also works with proportionality during the first stage of the enquiry to determine if a deprivation of freedom was undertaken "arbitrarily and without just cause" in applying section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution, but nevertheless endeavours to consider the matters referred to in section 36(1)(a) to (e) after it has concluded that there was an arbitrary deprival without just cause. 112 The elements of proportionality are also considered when the Constitutional Court applies the concept "arbitrary" in the provision in section 25(1) that "no law may permit the arbitrary deprival of property"; 113 when the Court reviews the justification by the state that it has taken "reasonable and other measures within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights" when it failed to provide access to adequate housing and to health care services, sufficient water and food and social security in 
Concluding remarks
Despite some opposition from certain academics, proportionality is a prominent feature of the application of the limitation clauses in the South African Constitution.
South Africa therefore participates fully in the global recognition and application of this mode of approaching the limitation of rights. On the merits of doing so, the following statement of Klatt and Meister seems to be appropriate:
All in all, proportionality is a structured approach to balancing fundamental rights with other rights and interests in the best possible way. It is a necessary means for making analytical distinctions that help in identifying the crucial aspects and considerations in various cases and circumstances and ensuring a proper argument. limitation of rights, of general and wide concepts such as "fairness", "reasonableness", "rationality", "public interest" and, somewhat surprisingly, also of the general concept "proportionality" as such. South Africa's participation in the global recognition and application of this way of dealing with the limitation of rights is worthwhile.
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